The positions of hedgers and speculators are correlated with returns in a number of futures markets, but there is much debate as to the interpretation of such a relationship-whether it reflects private information, liquidity, or trend-chasing behavior. This paper studies the relationship between positioning of hedgers and speculators and returns in equity futures markets. I propose a novel test of the private information hypothesis: analyzing the effect of public announcements about futures positions on prices, using high-frequency data in short windows around the announcements. I find that the revelation of speculators' positions is informative to investors more broadly, supporting the private information view. 
Introduction
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) requires large participants in futures markets to report their positions each week, and whether they are commercial (hedgers) or noncommercial (speculators). The main distinction that the CFTC makes in defining these two types of positions is whether or not the futures position is used to offset an underlying business activity. In this way, futures markets allow a natural decomposition of traders into these two types. The aim of this study is to understand the relationship between investors' positioning and equity index futures returns.
I use a novel approach-the announcement effect of positions releases-to examine the relationship between positions and returns for equity futures and specifically to test the theory of asymmetric information among participant types. Anecdotal market evidence has long indicated that information is gleaned from positioning data releases, but this idea has yet to be formally tested. Several papers have looked at the predictive relationship between positioning and returns, but these have largely focused on commodity futures markets and on explaining risk premia. Keynes (1930) conjectured that futures market risk premia should be related to positions because hedgers use futures markets to buy insurance. Some evidence for the Keynesian hedging pressure theory has been found in the context of commodity futures, and this paper explores whether this holds for financial futures as well.
To summarize the main results, I find a significant and positive contemporaneous relationship between net non-commercial positioning changes and returns. Moreover the relationship sticksthe subsequent periods' returns are not negatively correlated with positions in the current period.
A potential explanation for this is that non-commercial participants have private information. I find a significant market reaction to the public release of information about positions that supports the hypothesis of asymmetric information among trader types. Finally, I find evidence against the hypothesis that futures market risk premia result from hedging pressure.
The plan for the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 1, the features of the futures price data and positioning data are described. In Section 2, a strong contemporaneous relationship between futures returns and changes in positioning is documented. I further explore causality in this relationship and the extent to which the effect is sustained or reversed. An effect that is reversed indicates a temporary liquidity pressure, whereas a sustained effect is consistent with information asymmetries. In Section 3, I adopt a novel "event-study" approach by looking at the announcement effect in a small window of returns around the public release of positioning data by the CFTC. Section 4 contains the predictive regressions and Section 5 concludes.
Data
Two categories of data are used in this study: price data for equity futures contracts which are available in real-time to market participants, and positions for different types of futures traders that are collected by the CFTC and reported to the public on a weekly basis.
Price Data
Equity index futures contracts are cash-settled: both sides to a contract agree to a futures price, and if at expiration the index is above the futures price at which the trade was settled, then those with short positions are obligated to pay those with long positions a multiple of the difference between the index level and the futures price, and vice-versa. Not all financial futures contracts are cash-settled. For instance, bond futures are settled by delivery of pre-specified securities.
Daily and tick-by-tick price data were obtained for the futures and E-mini futures contracts for four equity indices from Price-Data and Tick Data. The eight contracts considered are as follows: (1) the Dow Jones Industrial Average (2) the Dow Jones Industrial Average E-mini, (3) the Nasdaq 100, (4) the Nasdaq 100 E-mini, (5) the Russell 2000, (6) the Russell 2000 E-mini, (7) the S&P 500, and (8), and the S&P 500 E-mini. End-of-week S&P 500 dividend yield data were obtained from Pinnacle Data Corporation. The data start in October 1992 for the S&P 500, A rolling futures price series for each contract series is created, using the front contract (closest to expiry) of each contract type. The contract is rolled over when the open interest in the expiring contract falls below that of the next contract in the cycle, typically 8 days prior to the contract expiration date. Daily futures returns are end-of-day observations. The last observation in each minute is extracted from the tick data to form a minute-by-minute series of futures returns.
Futures Participant Types and Positioning Data
The CFTC was created by an act of Congress in 1974 to regulate futures market trading. With this level of oversight and an aim to prevent collusion amongst traders and manipulation in futures markets, the CFTC requires futures market participants with positions above a certain level to report open interest on a weekly basis.
2 Data are collected by the CFTC each Tuesday, and reflect positions on that day. Then on Friday, the information collected three days prior is released to the public. 3 In October 1992 the CFTC began to collect positioning data on a weekly basis (previously it was collected semi-monthly and monthly). This study only covers the period since position releases became weekly.
The reported statistics include the number of positions held and the direction of these positions (long or short) for each contract. Reporting market participants must also identify whether the contracts were used for commercial (hedging) or non-commercial (speculative) activity. of the underlying asset. In this paper, I will refer to non-commercial participants as "speculators" and commercial participants as "hedgers," respectively.
Participation by trader type
Panel A of [ Figure I ]
The last three columns of Panel A in Table I show that on average over the sample period, all three classifications of participants are very close to net neutral. Commercial participants, which may represent speculators and hedgers (Ederington and Lee, 2002) , are likely investing in equity index futures contracts to protect against price increases as well as price declines. Panel B of 
Price discovery in the futures market
In The contemporaneous regressions that I study are all nested within the model:
where , 1 t t r  is the return (log change in futures price) from week t to week t+1 and 
Existing literature on contemporaneous pricing pressures
Klitgaard and Weir (2004) ran a regression of returns on contemporaneous speculative positioning changes for currency futures:
They found 2  to be positive, which they interpreted as evidence for either private information or for trend chasing of speculators. Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007) ran the regression in equation (2) and found the same results for non-financial futures as Klitgaard and Weir found for currency futures. Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst also ran the regression of returns on contemporaneous speculative positioning levels for non-financial futures alone:
They found 1  to be positive and significant and interpreted this as evidence of trend-chasing behavior.
Pricing pressure results
Results for equation (1), in , is always positive and it is significant for six out of eight contracts, whereas the sign of the coefficient on the level of positions, , 1 t t q  , is negative for some contracts. As an illustration, Figure II shows a scatterplot of weekly S&P 500 returns against position changes. A mild positive relationship, that does not appear to be the result of outliers, is visible. The magnitude of the coefficients from equation (1) shows that, for instance, a one percent change in non-commercial positioning implies a 19 basis point increase in the Nasdaq futures contract, which is economically significant. There were many weeks with changes in non-commercial positions as large as one percent over the sample.
[ Table II defined trader category, as described in Section 1.3, and so the following sections will focus on results for the non-commercial category.
Test of Trend-Chasing Hypothesis
To explore evidence of trend chasing, I test for Granger causality between position changes and returns. Each Tuesday, a snapshot of participants' positions is reported to the CFTC. First, I
regress the change in positions from week to t to week t+1 on one lag of the position changes and one lag of returns:
If the contemporaneous relationship shown in Table II reflects Table III show that the coefficient estimate on past returns is significant for only one of the eight futures contracts, which is negative, suggesting that trend chasing is not the explanation for the relationship shown in Table   II . A caveat, though, is that positive feedback trading could contribute to the contemporaneous relation between returns and position changes, but that it takes place at such high frequencies that it cannot be detected in weekly data. Kurov (2008) shows that positive feedback trading in index futures markets occurs at intraday frequencies.
[ Table III] 
Test of Temporary Liquidity Hypothesis
The second Granger causality equation regresses returns on lagged returns and lagged position
The aim of this regression is to determine whether there is a reversal in the effect of net position changes on returns in the subsequent period, above and beyond the effect of past returns on future returns. A true liquidity shock should not represent a change in the fundamental value of a futures contract, and so the effect of pricing pressure should be temporary, implying a negative relationship between returns and lagged position changes and so a negative value of 2  in equation (5). However, results in Panel B of Table III show that coefficient estimates on the lagged net position change are not significant for any of the eight futures contracts, suggesting that the new price level holds, supporting the view that the contemporaneous pricing pressures documented above do not reflect temporary liquidity effects either.
Lead-Lag Relationships between Returns and Position Changes
It is, in principle, possible that the effect from past net position changes to future returns extends beyond one period. Figure III significant, but it is also close to 0. So, it appears that the price change sticks and is not reversed in subsequent periods.
[ Figure III] 
Positioning Announcement Effect and the Private Information Hypothesis
This section proposes a new test of the private information hypothesis. If speculators have private information, then news revealing their positions will be informative to investors more broadly; none of the other interpretations for the contemporaneous relationship between position changes and returns has this implication. The CFTC releases information about investors' positions weekly on Fridays at 3:30 p.m. with a lag of a few days from the collection date (typically Tuesdays). Under the private information story, there should be a significant market reaction to this news upon its release to the public.
Using standard market efficiency arguments, only the unexpected component of the positioning data released by the CFTC should matter-the expected portion of the data should already be priced into the futures quotes. The announcement expectation is not observed, so it is proxied by running an augmented autoregression of positions (Tuesday at t) on lagged positions (Tuesday at t-1) and lagged returns (from Friday t-1 to t) as follows:
The regressions are run recursively, so that a different regression is run each week, using only data available at the time of the expectation formation (Friday t)-the history of positions through the previous week (Tuesday t-1) and returns through the week of the release (Friday t-1 to Friday t). The unexpected change in net positions is defined as the difference between the realized net position at time t and the predicted value of the net position as of Friday t, as shown in equation (7)  will be significant and positive.
Results from the regression in equation (8) show a significant and positive reaction to event windows around the report release time for four out of the eight indices, seen in Table IV The results hold under these robustness checks. The effect is significant at only a short horizon, however. With a larger event window, the effect of the positioning announcement is apparently swamped by other shocks hitting the equity index futures market.
[ Table IV ]
It seems reasonable that many of the speculators would be informed traders. Their profits depend on successful speculation as participation in the market is not motivated by some other underlying business need. There are several reasons that an informed trader may prefer to transact in the futures market instead of the cash market. First, the notional contract amount does not need to be paid up front. A much larger futures position can be taken than in the cash market with the same amount of funding. Second, a security does not need to be borrowed before a 
Theories of futures market risk premia
In this section, I consider the relationship between positioning and future expected returns in financial futures markets. As a futures contract has no up-front cost, the expected return on a futures position is the risk premium. Predictive regressions allow measurement of futures risk premia over various horizons. 6 To study the determinants of futures risk premia, I look at a predictive regression of equity futures returns on predictor variables that include positions.
Let ,
t t h r  denote a futures return from t to t h  , let t q denote the net-long speculative position in a particular futures market at time t and let t dy denote the dividend yield, which is often found to be useful for forecasting financial returns more generally.
7
The predictive regressions that I study are all nested within the model: 
The aim of estimating this predictive regression is to differentiate among a number of views of what drives risk premia in futures markets:
(i) Keynes' hedging theory rests on the assumption that speculators do not earn excess returns from superior forecasting abilities, but rather from simply taking on the price risk of the underlying instruments. Keynes (1930) maintained that a producer will hedge future production and thus be net short the underlying. Speculators will take a long position to exploit this hedging need and to earn the risk premium associated with taking on the hedgers' risk. Speculators are in effect providing insurance in exchange for positive expected returns. The greater is the hedging demand of producers, the larger a risk premium the speculators demand.
The argument does not rely on hedgers being producers of the commodity (which would not make sense in a financial futures contract). The argument is simply that speculators are (ii) Hardy (1940) postulated that speculators enjoy gambling in futures markets and are willing to pay money, on average, for the privilege. In this case, the net long speculative position should be negatively correlated with future returns and 1  in equation (9) should be negative.
(iii) A temporary liquidity or price-pressure effect could be created by hedging demand. This is different from the Keynesian hedging pressure view in that an increase in short hedging demand drives the futures contract price down, but only temporarily. In the next period, the price then rebounds, and the greater hedging demand has no effect on subsequent expected returns. The hedger has to give a price concession to the speculator to get the trade done immediately. An increase in the short hedging demand between t-1 and t causes the price to fall from t-1 to t, to induce the speculator to take a long position, but then to rebound from t to t+1. Under this scenario, the coefficient 2  should be positive.  is expected to be positive, and its inclusion in the regression might weaken or reduce the significance of the other regression coefficients.
The main difference between explanations (i) and (iii) (downward sloping demand curves versus price pressure) is that the demand curve suggests a certain relationship between a quantity and a price whereas pricing pressure suggests that it is the change in quantity that affects prices. The latter hypothesis can be more precisely identified as either a temporary liquidity pressure or a consequence of better forecasting ability of speculative investors.
Existing literature on futures market risk premia
De Roon, Nijman, and Veld (2000) estimate a special case of the predictive regression in equation (9). Their most general regression is
For non-equity financial futures and non-financial futures, they obtain positive and significant (11), but find that significance disappears when business cycle indicators are added.
Results on one-period predictive regressions
First, I regress returns during the week following the collection of positions data (Tuesday t to Tuesday t+1) on the net long non-commercial level of positions on Tuesday t alone, as in equation (11). The top of Panel A in Table V shows that this regression yields a negative coefficient that is statistically significant for 2 out of 8 equity futures contracts, the Nasdaq and the S&P 500. This result is surprising in that it goes in the opposite direction of that predicted by the Keynesian hedging hypothesis and is, rather, consistent with the view of Hardy (1940) .
[Table V]
This result remains true when controlling for the change in positions and the dividend yield, as shown in the middle and bottom portions of Panel A in Table V . Overall, these results provide very little evidence of predictability in futures returns, at least at this very short (one week)
horizon. It argues against the Keynesian hedging hypothesis and is consistent with the findings of Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst and Wang (2003) . Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst did not consider any financial futures, but they did note that they were unable to replicate the results of de Roon, Nijman and Veld, and they suggested that the regressions run by de Roon, Nijman and Veld were in fact contemporaneous rather than predictive. Table V shows the results of a regression of eight-week cumulative returns on variables at the start of the holding period, i.e. the estimation of equation (9) with h=8 (Newey-West standard errors are used to control for the overlapping error structure). Results for h=4 are included in the web appendix. These regressions present potential problems of statistical inference, as both the left-and right-hand side variables are persistent. Nevertheless, only one of the eight contracts in estimation of equation (11) with h=8 shows a significant and positive relationship between positions and future returns. As in the case of the one-period forecasting, the predictive relationship for the other significant coefficients goes in the opposite direction of that predicted by Keynesian hedging pressure.
Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between positioning of different types of participants (hedgers and speculators) and returns in equity index futures markets. Both contemporaneous and predictive regressions are considered. I find a strong contemporaneous relationship between returns and position changes: when speculators add to their net long positions, returns are high.
There are a number of possible explanations for this finding, including private information, 9 In footnote 14 of Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst. liquidity, or positive feedback effects. I propose a new test of the private information hypothesis that is based on analyzing the effect of public announcements about futures positions on prices.
Intradaily price data show that investors systematically react to announcements about investor positioning, which supports the private information view and is consistent with anecdotal market evidence that market participants take some direction from the positioning profile of large speculators. Meanwhile, from predictive regressions of returns on futures positions, I find little evidence that hedging pressure explains equity futures risk premia, as Keynes (1930) had hypothesized. 
Figure III
Notes: Figure III shows the correlation coefficients between weekly returns for S&P 500 futures and net non-commercial position changes for these contracts. Values to the left of zero denote correlations between returns and lags 1-20 of position changes, and values to the right of zero denote correlations between returns and leads 1-20 of position changes. The horizontal lines show the minimum absolute sample correlations that are required for the hypothesis that the population correlation is equal to zero to be rejected, using the fact that if a population correlation is equal to zero then the corresponding sample correlation in a sample of size T is asymptotically N(0,1/T).
